it's a corporate world

are the corporations cutting back

Here is a link to an interesting lecture given by Hans J. Hillerbrand at the 2011 Colloquy at Lutheran Theological Seminary at Gettysburg (pages 9-20).

Hillerbrand sets out to consider what Luther’s position on Christian Faith and politics would have been. He begins with Luther’s dinner table remark that, “Christ has nothing to do with politics.” From there he goes on to consider the question any seminary student sitting with the contradiction between that Lutheran tradition of “quietism” and the Lutheran notion of “vocation” or “priesthood of all believers” has entertained

Hillerbrand phrases the question, “Really? Jesus has nothing to do with how we as Christians relate our faith to our daily lives, to our vocations, our professions?”

I might put the question another way; if we say that every vocation that serves the neighbor is laudable, why do we draw the line at advocacy?

Or, to put it a little more bluntly; don’t we act nearly schizophrenic when we insist that someone fallowing their vocation to advocate for the vulnerable are somehow acting on a principle of “justification by works?”

However you phrase the question, though, the cognitive dissonance must be addressed. Hillerbrand sets out to resolve the tension by putting Luther’s sentiment in the context of his experience of social reform and church reform. To summarize Hillerbrand’s argument, Luther stopped associating his religious reforms from social reforms once the issue of reform (social AND church) became associated to disruption of the law.

“Luther clearly became concerned about the connection of reform and the disruption of law and order. Aufruhr (uproar, rioting) seemed to be making the rounds, endangering the gospel. Societal reform could not put religious reform at risk.”

Hillerbrand supports this notion by attending to the fact that the early in his career Luther did not hesitate to address social issues in need of reform, i.e. Sermon on Usury. For instance, in his “To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,” Luther dedicates the second section to the reforms that are needed in society. Aside from noting the particular topics in the second section, one only needs to note the title to suspect that the concerns of this treatise will be comprehensive reform.

The conclusion Hillerbrand comes to is an open question, “what would have happened if Luther had been able to deal with the issue of Aufruhr separately from the question of whether the Christian faith has a word for the social and political realm.”

While this question is interesting, I think there is a stronger conclusion we can reach.

I believe we can use a critique often employed by the prophets of the Hebrew Scriptures. Prophets such as Amos, Isaiah and Hosea often condemn cultic prophets due to how they regard their employment by the temple or their own self-interest. These prophets are so worried about their job that the integrity of their prophecies are eliminated (Micah 3:5). In other words, the fact that these prophets are employed by the temple means they cannot speak about that state of the temple politic with reliability.

Is it too much to imagine that Luther had every reason to appease Elector Frederick since Luther was being protected, and employed, by Frederick?

Hillerbrand seems to come close to making this claim when he notes that after the “Wittenberg Disturbances” of 1521 Luther sent word that he would write a treatise on Aufruhr. The suggestion is Luther sent word of his plan so his elector, Fredrick, would hear of his disapproval of the peasant’s uproar.

Hillerbrand gets even closer to making this critique of Lutheran when he notes that Luther’s assumption that religious reform could only happen in harmony with political rulers leads Luther to a precarious position.

Imagining that reform must happen in harmony with the political leaders, as Luther did, forces one to simultaneously call for a vision of biblical justice while all the while placing the realization of this vision in the hand of the properly established (allusion to Luther’s Twelve Article) political authorities.

What if, however, we apply the criticism of the prophets to Luther as well?

What if what is precarious about Luther’s position is not the inconsistencies, but how it protects his interests? What if what is precarious about Luther’s position is that his pseudo-theological defense of rulers undermines the religious reforms he is working for by abandoning the people the religious reform were intended for?

What if what is so apparent to the prophets applies to Luther as well, that religious piety is always related to social justice? Perhaps what is most precarious about Luther’s position is that in trying to further his immediate interests, he undercuts them by ignoring their broad conclusions.

Ultimately, it is easy to have sympathy with Luther. Ultimately, it is easy to give into the momentum of traditional interpretations of Luther. Perhaps we are called, though, to humbly look at our founder and learn from his insights as well as his cowardice.